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INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of Joko Widodo’s administration in
2014, the world was startled by Indonesian firm policy to
sink domestic and foreign fishing vessels caught stealing
fish in Indonesian waters. The policy is known as ‘Sink
the Vessels,’ led by Susi Pudjiastuti as the Minister of Ma-
rine Affairs and Fisheries. The minister has been known
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Abstrak
Agenda era kepemimpinan Presiden Joko Widodo menyasar langkah-langkah tegas dalam melindungi keamanan dan kedaulatan maritim
Indonesia; terutama kedaulatan dan keamanan maritim di sekitar teritorial laut. Namun, implementasi ini menghadapi tantangan terkait
pelanggaran kedaulatan. Salah satunya adalah pencurian ikan oleh kapal-kapal nelayan asing yang mengancam jumlah cadangan ikan di
perairan Indonesia. Berhadapan dengan ancaman tersebut, komitmen Indonesia untuk menjaga kedaulatan dan keamanan maritim nampak
dari pengambilan kebijakan ‘tenggelamkan kapal’ oleh Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan (KKP), yang dipimpin oleh Susi Pudjiastuti sejak
tahun 2014. Dalam konteks polemik Laut China Selatan yang berhubungan dengan perairan wilayah Indonesia, terutama di seputar perairan
Natuna, kebijakan tersebut memiliki implikasi signifikan terhadap geopolitik Laut China Selatan. Pertanyaan yang muncul adalah apa implikasi
kebijakan ‘Sink the Vessels’ terhadap geopolitik maritim di Laut China Selatan? Dengan menggunakan pendekatan strukturasi dan geopolitik,
artikel ini menyatakan bahwa kebijakan ‘IUU Fishing’ Indonesia meningkatkan kompleksitas keamanan maritim di Laut China Selatan. Dalam
konteks kebijakan ini, interaksi di Laut China Selatan pada akhirnya mengarah pada penguatan perilaku realisme politik di antara negara-
negara yang berpotensi konflik dengan Indonesia di perairan Natuna.
Kata kunci: Indonesia, IUU Fishing, tenggelamkan kapal, Laut China Selatan, geopolitik, strukturasi.
Abstract
The agenda of Jokowi’s administration demands a strong measure to protect maritime security and sovereignty of Indonesia; especially its
national sovereignty and maritime security in the vast boundary of Indonesian territorial waters. However, the implementation faces chal-
lenges related to violations of sovereignty in the territorial waters. One of them was due to the rampant illegal fishing activities that threaten
the sufficiency of the fish stock. Exposed to such threat, Indonesia’s commitment to secure its maritime sovereignty was strongly projected
by the emergence of a ‘Sink the Vessels’ policy by the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), chaired by Susi Pudjiastuti since 2014. In
the context of the South China Sea polemics which shows the relationship with the territorial waters of Indonesia in Natuna, the policy has
significant implication to the South China Sea maritime geopolitics. The question is what the implications of the ‘Sink the Vessels’ policy
toward maritime geopolitics in the South China Sea. Using structuration and geopolitics approaches, this article argues that Indonesia’s IUU
Fishing policy enhances the complexity of maritime security in the South China Sea which ultimately leads to the strengthening of political
realism behaviour among countries whom potential to conflict with Indonesia in the context of IUU Fishing in Natuna waters.
Keywords: Indonesia, IUU Fishing, sink the vessels, South China Sea, geopolitics, structuration.
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as an assertive person in completing her duties. The ‘Sink
the Vessels’ policy is considered as Indonesia’s strong com-
mitment to implement ‘Global Maritime Axis’ agenda by
President Joko Widodo that demands the ability of Indo-
nesia to secure its maritime security and national sove-
reignty. The perspective used was originated from ‘reassert-
ing the long-standing archipelagic outlook.’ President
Widodo values the waters surrounding the Indonesian
archipelago for its economic potential and national
strength, rather than deems it as a natural disadvantage
(Gindarsah & Priamarizki, 2015). The policy is consider-
ed highly important by the Indonesian government due
to Indonesia’s geographical terrain. As an archipelagic state,
Indonesia is exposed to rampant illegal fishing activities
which lead to the decline of fish stocks in the territorial
waters of Indonesia (Chapsos & Malcolm, 2017; Connelly,
2015; Febrica, 2017; Gindarsah & Priamarizki, 2015;
Hongzhou, 2015; Nainggolan, 2015; Negara & Das, 2017).
Locations with the highest level of illegal fishing activity
are identified in Anambas and Natuna waters. In the span
of 2014, 78 foreign fishing vessels detained for illegal fish-
ing activity in the area. According to Anambas Vice Re-
gent, Abdul Haris, the number of fish theft activities threat-
ened the occupation of 90% of Anambas people who work
as fishermen (Rohingati, 2014).
The illegal fishing activities of foreign fishermen in
Indonesian waters raise polemics. The policy of detonat-
ing foreign fishing vessels caught stealing fish in Indone-
sian waters, especially in Natuna, triggered responses from
the origin countries of the vessels. Meanwhile, the current
maritime security of Southeast Asia is facing a potential
threat from maritime delimitation boundary disputes in
the South China Sea. Researchers argue that a unique
contestation revealed after Indonesia implemented the
‘Sink the Vessels’ policy, especially in Natuna. From the
geopolitical approach, it is apparent that the involvement
of countries related to the South China Sea conflict is
inevitable (for instance China and Vietnam as two dis-
puted states over territorial claims in the South China Sea
whose fishermen have been heavily highlighted in fish theft
activities). Given the background, this article aims to
analyse the implication of IUU Fishing Policy in Indone-
sia toward maritime geopolitics of the South China Sea.
This article argues that the policy created a stronger politi-
cal realism of states whose fishermen involved in illegal
fishing in Natuna waters. This situation leads to the cre-
ation of anarchy system in the South China Sea that was
covered by conflictual and rational dimension. Not all states
whose vessels had sunk behave reactively like China. Se-
veral states’ behaviour, such as Vietnam and Malaysia, were
based on the consideration of the existing threat in the
South China Sea.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
ANALYSING THE IMPLICATION OF IUU FISHING POLICY
THROUGH TWO THEORETICAL APPROACHES
This paper analyses Indonesia’s IUU Fishing Policy by
combining two theoretical frameworks to approach the
implication of the policy within Natuna territorial waters
towards the geopolitics of the South China Sea. Firstly,
this paper utilizes structuration theory by Anthony Giddens
as a fundamental framework to understand the interna-
tional system revealed around Natuna waters. Thereafter,
this paper chooses to exert Geopolitics approach by Ralf
Emmer to explain the geopolitics of Natuna position re-
lated to the South China Sea disputes. The preference was
based on two approaches that accommodate the research
urgency to capture the dynamic of the issue comprehen-
sively; particularly regarding states response to maintain
their existence under the threat of interstate relations in
the international system which heavily influenced by geo-
political paradigm. In other words, Indonesian response
to formulate a firm policy to tackle illegal fishing, whether
inside or outside Indonesian territorial waters, is a
behaviour taken based on the perception of threat. How-
ever, the involvement of foreign fishers triggered the need
to look at the external interaction between states whose
fishermen captured, and their vessels sunk for illegal fish-
ing. Thus, the policy could not be overlooked because of
its tangible implication to the international system in the
South China Sea which geographically closes to Natuna
waters.
Starting the discussion from Giddens’ theoretical frame-
work, analysing phenomena which closely related to secu-
rity studies is an uncommon preference, particularly be-
cause of his background as a sociologist from London
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School of Economics which represents British School in
understanding globalisation and modernity. This article,
however, regards Giddens’ structuralism approach is in-
fluential in dismantling the relation between Natuna and
the South China Sea which located in the same interna-
tional system. If an international system is perceived as a
media for states to articulate their existence, thus, the in-
ternational system is equal to the social system. According
to Giddens, intensified social relations signified by shap-
ing each other (instead of merely influencing the other)
has connected human (as an agent)—with short coverage
yet high persistence—to the society (as structure) which
constitutively influence each other. Regarded as Giddens’
masterpiece, this theory is frequently discussed in his book
titled The Constitutions of Society: Outline of the Theory of
Structuration (1986). This approach is significant in reveal-
ing how repetition and interaction from agent and struc-
ture will eventually create a structure. According to Barker
(2011), structuration encompasses three dimensions. The
first dimension is an interpretation which pronounces a
manner of understanding. The second dimension is mo-
rality or a precise direction to express how things should
be done. The third is power in acting by stating agent’s
way to achieve a wish. Duality in a structure (not dualism)
constructed in a social system becomes an important fac-
tor of Gidden’s approach to understand the phenomena
in this research. States involved in the maritime constella-
tion of South China Sea are agents who produce a struc-
ture in the region. On the other hand, Natuna has gained
importance in the conflict of the South China Sea due to
its geographical status as an outer island in Indonesia. This
is also because international system is a social system which
can be measured by the interaction within it.
The significant aspects of a sovereign nation concept
are understanding, comprehension, and awareness of each
individual state about a nation’s sovereignty. The compre-
hension and awareness related to space and borders are a
manifestation of the sovereignty of a nation. The strategic
value of space and borders is essential for the unity of a
nation. As expressed by Ratzel (1940), a reputable geogra-
pher, emphasized that the apprehension of a nation to-
ward the conception of territory will determine the size of
the state. The value of space in this context will only ap-
pear if there is any interaction or social process that formed
a consensus about the space utility. Mentioned by Agnew
and Crobridge (2002), geography may ‘matter,’ but only
as a moment in which abstract universal social processes—
such as social stratification, state-building, and ideological
hegemony—are revealed in space. Given the importance
of space and the social interaction that formed it, it is es-
sential to maintain the unity of a territory. Stated by
Malmberg (1992: 117–23), “Even for some who claim that
‘space matters,’ therefore, it matters only contingently
rather than necessarily.”
Departed from those understandings, this article high-
lights Natuna’s geographical proximity to the South China
Sea and the geopolitical dynamic in the region. Therefore,
the second theoretical framework in this article uses mari-
time and geopolitics approaches as a tool to measure the
implication of Indonesian policy in the Natuna waters in
tackling the fish theft and its relation to the South China
Sea geopolitical circumstances. As stated by Ralf Emmers
(2009: 9), there are three primary attributes in geopoliti-
cal approach, namely “The interpretation of territory, natu-
ral resources, and the distribution of power is based on a
material and an ideational reading of their role in interna-
tional security relations.” The first attribute, according to
Emmer, is the territory: “Territory is associated with state-
hood, national boundaries, territorial claims, and nation-
alism. Territory provides economic and strategic advan-
tages to a state by increasing its political leverage in the
international system” (Emmers, 2009: 10).
State as a historical unit emerged in human civiliza-
tion, interlinked with the sovereignty concept of a nation,
demands a clear and rigid territorial border to secure the
state’s legitimation in international politics. Furthermore,
the clarity of territorial border is a strategic sector in pro-
viding benefit and increasing Indonesian bargaining posi-
tion in global political affairs. On the other hand, natural
resources according to Emmers, interpreted as “Natural
resources and energy needs have traditionally influenced
the foreign policy objectives of states. The question of natu-
ral resources has shifted from the low politics of domestic
production and consumption to the high politics of na-
tional security” (Emmers, 2009: 11). In this manner, Em-
mers attempted to highlight that natural resources (in this
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context is fishes) should be a priority for national security.
In accordance with Emmers’ view, Amitav Acharya
(2002: 324) argues that “The tendency of security studies
to focus on a particular segment of the international sys-
tem to the exclusion of another is ironic given the fact
that it is in the neglected arena that the vast majority of
conflicts have taken place.” Security issues faced by the
third world countries are entirely different with predomi-
nant paradigm about security in regional studies. Subse-
quently, in the third world countries, the nature of na-
tional security appeared merely as a dubious symbol, com-
pare to the value of national security in the developed coun-
try with more advanced governance (Christoper & Meng,
2011). Acharya explained further about resource scarcity,
overpopulation, underdevelopment, and environmental
degradation was at the heart of insecurity in the third world.
Given the significance of economic development and
wellbeing, economic development is eventually perceived
as an influential factor in national security.
Given the fact that natural resources are fundamental
for third world countries, Emmers proposed the third di-
mension, distribution of power which explained as follows,
“In order to offer a unified concept, this discussion briefly
describes this third geopolitical variable by referring to both a
classical realist interpretation of the power phenomenon and
more recent interpretations of its current role in international
security relations. Yet, it should be noted that this volume
primarily adopts a realist view of the concept, understood
through its military aspect. This discussion also concludes
with a review of another concept central to realism: the bal-
ance of power” (Emmers, 2009: 12).
Emmers’ approach emphasized the geopolitical context
which highly influenced by Hobbesian realism which de-
scribes the power relation for actors in international af-
fairs. At this point, the geographical proximity between
Natuna waters and the South China Sea increases the plau-
sibility of Indonesia to get involved in regional disputes.
This view is supported by Asia-Pacific Regional Security
Assessment 2016 report. It revealed that “Maritime secu-
rity in the Indo-Pacific region is a complex subject, span-
ning a range of challenges from the tensions in the South
China Sea through other territorial disputes to diverse”
(IISS, 2016, para. 1). Therefore, comprehension regarding
the unstable security condition due to border disputes in
the region is essential to understand the dynamic of rela-
tions between Indonesia, China, and Vietnam in the South
China Sea disputes. Natuna as a northern gate in the In-
donesian border appears to drag Indonesia into a pro-
longed conflict in the South China Sea dispute.
RESULT AND ANALYSES
NATUNA POSITION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: A GEOPOLITI-
CAL CONTESTATION
This section provides an insight into geopolitical archi-
tecture of Indonesia within the South China Sea disputes.
Analysing this geopolitical architecture of the South China
Sea disputes becomes important due to the strategic posi-
tion of Natuna as an integral part of Indonesia—the lar-
gest archipelagic country—and one of the biggest economic
powers in the South East Asia. This brings certain conse-
quences, particularly due to its proximity to the conflict-
ing area of the South China Sea.
The structure of this section will be divided as follows;
firstly, it describes the conceptual understanding related
to geopolitics discourse as a theoretical formulation codi-
fied into an intellectual discussion. Secondly, the chapter
will discuss the geopolitical architecture of the South China
Sea. Finally, the conclusion will be delivered by linking
Natuna as archipelago clusters in northern Indonesia and
the South China Sea disputes.
Geopolitical architecture in this context is understood
as how state accesses, manages, and regulates the dynamic
of territory within their sovereignty border and its interac-
tion in cross-border dimension. Stated by Doods (2007:
55), “Geopolitical architecture is generally seen as the ways
in which states access, manage and regulate the intersec-
tion of territories and flows, and, in so doing establish
borders between inside/outside and domestic/interna-
tional.” However, established geopolitics-related studies
only highlighted the importance of geographical context
as a security tool of the foreign policy of a state (Kasperson
& Minghi, 2011). Geopolitics paradigm should also em-
brace the perception of politic and security elites regard-
ing the nature of their territory, known as ‘political-geo-
graphical mental maps’ (Muir & Paddison, 1981). There-
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fore, there is an urge to portray geopolitical architecture in
a flexible way instead of scrutinizing spatial and political
dimension. This also should be regarded from the perspec-
tive of geographical dimension from the context of social,
economic, culture, politics, and security.
Geographically, the South China Sea encompasses
waters and land from two main archipelagos, Spratly and
Paracels Islands, and Macclesfield River and Scarborough
coral, ranging from Malacca Strait to Taiwan Strait. Given
the wide landscape and the history of territory acquisition
of nearby states such as China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Phil-
ippines, and Brunei Darussalam are tangled in claims and
acquisition for partial or entire waters area. Indonesia was
not originally one of claimant state but turned the inten-
tion to claim the area since China declared an absolute
claim for the waters in 2012. The South China Sea is stra-
tegic with abundant natural resources. Interstate conflict
in the region occurred since the 1970s, recurring in the
1980s, 1990s, 2010s, until present. However, it could not
be denied that in the past, the claimant parties from China
and Vietnam, and other claimant states have recorded as a
claimant who seeks control in the area.
The fact that the South China Sea has tremendous
potential in natural resources, including mineral, gas, and
oil, have been revealed to the world. China is strongly op-
timistic about these potencies of natural resources and has
conducted intensive research in the area. Based on the
Energy Information Administration (EIA) Report, China
estimated that the South China Sea possesses 213 billion
barrels of oil reserve, which is equal to ten times of the
United States (US) national oil reserve. The US scientists
estimate that there is an oil reserve equivalent to 28 bil-
lion barrels of oil in the waters. Report from EIA revealed
that the biggest reserves originated from natural gas, reach-
ing 900 trillion cubic, or equal to Qatar’s national oil re-
serves. Besides, the South China Sea waters are also the
main navigation route for various states in the surround-
ing area in the hunt for fish (EIA, 2013).
The claim disputes over territorial sovereignty in the
South China Sea converged waters and land into two ar-
eas, Paracel and Spratly Islands. In the area, lays uninha-
bited islands, atoll, and coral. The disputed areas range a
hundred miles from southern to the eastern side of Hainan
Province. China’s claim on the area is based on their occu-
pation from 2000 years ago when Paracel and Spratly Is-
lands were part of the Chinese. According to the Chinese
Government, they published a map with detailed infor-
mation about China’s claim to the South China Sea in
1947.1
There are six parties directly involved in the disputes:
China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Viet-
nam, and Malaysia. These parties have overlapped data to
prove their claims. Vietnam built their claims based on
historical record, continental shelf, and economic exclu-
sive zone regulated in UNCLOS. In their perspective,
Paracel and Spratly Islands were under the rule of Nguyen
Dynasty lead by Gia Long Emperor from 1801-1802, just
until before the French colonization took place (Anh,
2014). The Philippines also used historic, proximity, in-
vention, relational approach, and UNCLOS data to sup-
port their claim. Several islands in Spratly were once uti-
lized as Japanese Navy base for military operation in South
East Asia in the World War II. After Japan had been de-
feated, the newly independent Philippines declared their
intention to utilize the island. Thus, the Philippines first
made their claim in the United Nations General Assem-
bly.2
However, the agreement did not explain details regard-
ing the disputes in Spratly Islands, and only displayed the
willingness to resolve the problem in a peaceful manner,
yet leaving the discussion about the core problems in
nation’s sovereignty. Given the border uncertainty between
claimant states, the conflicting parties still actually had
the opportunity to maximize their territorial claims. This
makes the possibility of open conflict in the area is prone
to increase (Usman & Sukma, 1997). For example, the
Philippine government had issued a presidential decree
Number 1956, demanding the right of Spratly Islands.
Malaysia also listed three islands from southern Spratly
to their maritime map. Meanwhile, China included two
clusters of U-shaped islands to their territory in Maritime
Constitution dated 25 February 1992. The situation pro-
longed until July 2011 where China protested to the Phi-
lippines’ plan to explore oil and gas in the waters. The
Philippines had invited foreign investors to explore 15
potential points. China questioned the area number 3 and
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number 4 (see Figure 1) in the northern Palawan Province
the Philippines, 820 kilometres in the southwest of Ma-
nila. One area located only 79 kilometres from the west-
ern side of Palawan Islands. The Philippine Government
had stressed that the area is under the Philippines terri-
tory (Kemenhan, 2011). Other than six claimants, states
outside the region also have enormous attention to the
South China Sea territory.
The interests of states outside the area of the South
China Sea increase the complexity of the conflict. The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) decided
to get involved in the disputes by responding to the occur-
ring conflict in the area. In 22nd July 1992, Foreign Minis-
ters of ASEAN countries adopted the ASEAN Declara-
tion of Conduct on the South China Sea which suggests
all the involved parties to resolve the conflict in a peaceful
manner based on the principal of Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC). Furthermore, ASEAN attempted to
resolve the South China Sea conflict with various strate-
gies such as discussing the South China Sea issues in
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Summit, or bring-
ing the issue to the international legal framework. In 1994,
2001, and 2011, ARF conducted a series of discussion about
the South China Sea disputes. The issues are taken into
ASEAN Summit four times: in Summit V, XI, XVII, and
XIX. ASEAN also demonstrated various conflict resolu-
tion strategies such as conferences, seminars, and joint
working groups (Thayer, 2012).
Until the date, ASEAN and China had achieved for-
mal agreement called Declaration of Conduct (DoC)
signed in 2002. The signatory countries should comply
with the rules to control the activities that could compli-
cate or increase the tension in the region, such as sending
people to inhabit the area. Claimant states also agreed to
promote natural sources in the conflicted states through
the possibility of cooperation in exploring the gas and oil
in Spratly Island as the initial step to resolve the problem
(Claudia, 2012; Kemenhan, 2011). However, the efforts
taken have not succeeded in preventing the provocative
activities of claimant states.
Indonesia as one of the ASEAN members has attempted
to resolve the problem of the South China Sea since the
1980s. Indonesia has actively participated in solving the
dispute through the governmental or non-governmental
way. The Indonesian government also proposed DoC and
encouraged Code of Conduct (CoC) managed by ASEAN
and China in 2002. However, DoC was not yet able to
supervise claimant states to stop doing provocative action.
Thus, in 2012 Indonesia proposed Zero Clean Draft, re-
garded as an initial step for ASEAN states and China to
sit in one table to solve the problem after a deadlock in
the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Cambo-
dia, 2012. Zero clean draft incorporates the Indonesian
proposal about how conflicting states should behave in
the proper manner. This draft encompassed proposal to
ASEAN members and China. The draft was not intended
to strengthen the claims of any party, but wish to provide
details on how all parties should behave to achieve the
conflict resolution (Kompas, 2012).
The Indonesian government also responds to many
incidents which triggered tension in the South China Sea
area. In an annual speech in 2013, Indonesian Foreign
Minister, Marty Natalegawa highlighted various actions
undertook by Indonesia in 2012 in preventing armed con-
flict in the South China Sea territory and attempted to
converge ASEAN members’ outlook about the South
China Sea. Should any difference occurred in the com-
mon perspective of ASEAN members, Indonesia re-
sponded it by demonstrating shuttle diplomacy to consoli-
date ASEAN position according to six-point principles.
Indonesian diplomacy encouraged a comprehensive imple-
mentation of DoC including the regional CoC through
the basic agreement of CoC and its initial proposal
(Natalegawa, 2013).
Indonesia’s intention to be a mediator in the South
China Sea conflict is a manifestation of the country’s fo-
reign policy under the administration of Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono. The foreign policy in Yudhoyono administra-
tion emphasized the significance of multilateral diplomatic
to create the image of middle power in the international
system in the 21st century.3 The interpretation of free and
active policy was adjusted to the international circum-
stances where the shift of global power to Asia as an inter-
pretation of the ‘active’ principle. There were at least three
metaphors reflected on the foreign policy alteration at that
time. The first was ‘navigating a turbulent ocean,’ the se-
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cond was ‘all directions foreign policy’ and the last was ‘a
thousand friends and zero enemies.’4 It was apparent that
in Yudhoyono administration, there were few or nearly no
diplomatic activities in the maritime sector. It was argued
that this was because Indonesia preferred to avoid direct
involvement in the South China Sea conflict. In the pe-
riod, Indonesia did not want to be considered as part of
the dispute (Rosyidin, 2017).
Under the Jokowi administration, Indonesian approach
to the South China Sea conflict had shifted. Original in-
tention to seek peaceful resolution for the disputes in the
region has altered to be a policy that serves Indonesian
national interest in Natuna waters, evoking disapproval
from China (Chen et al., 2014; Connelly, 2015; Hamzah,
2015; Pattiradjawane, 2015; Ristian & Supriyanto, 2015;
Rosyidin, 2017; Sambhi, 2015; Weatherbee, 2016). The
approach exemplifying the reality of South China Sea dis-
putes has become closer with Indonesian waters territory.
The realism of Indonesian politic in securing the natural
resources had set Natuna to be the flashpoint of various
interests between claimant states. Given the anarchical situ-
ation of international system, Indonesia decided to be as-
sertive in responding to the conflict.
Indonesia as a long-established agent who preserved
the image of ‘an honest broker’ in the South China Sea
maritime structure experienced many challenges regard-
ing the territory claim (Connelly, 2016). The behaviour
shift shown by Indonesia in responding various maritime
issues had alarmed many countries whose fishermen were
caught in Natuna waters. This article captures that the shift
has two important consequences for Indonesia. Firstly,
Indonesia intended to walk solely to realize its aims as the
world maritime axis by emphasizing nation’s maritime
sovereignty. At the same time, there is a growing consider-
ation if Indonesia had decided to overlook regional soli-
darity, particularly for states who objected China’s unila-
teral claim of the South China Sea territory.
The argument is inherent with Aaron L. Connelly’s
statement (2016: 1) in his work titled Indonesia in the South
China Sea: Going it Alone, expressed that “Under President
Jokowi, Indonesia’s approach to the South China Sea dis-
putes has moved from that of an active diplomatic actor
seeking a peaceful resolution to the broader disputes, to
one primarily focused on protecting its own interests
around the Natuna Islands while not antagonising China.”
For instance, on 17 June 2016, a small Indonesian Navy
corvette, the KRI Imam Bonjol, encountered at least seven
Chinese fishing boats and two much larger Chinese Coast
Guard vessels in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) near the remote Natuna Islands (Associated Press,
2016). The Natunas are the northernmost point of the
Indonesian archipelago, between Borneo and the Malay-
sian Peninsula, stretching into the far southern end of the
South China Sea. Neighbours have long acknowledged the
waters north of the Natunas as part of Indonesia’s EEZ,
but the Chinese Foreign Ministry has since the 1990s im-
plied—and in 2016 for the first time openly declared—that
they are ‘traditional Chinese fishing grounds.’5
Figure 1. Map of Border Delimitation in Natuna with
the South China Sea
Source: Forbes (2014)
Friction in Natuna with China is an intriguing vari-
able which exposed the geopolitical context of this article.
In the Jokowi administration, the relations between Indo-
nesia and China has improved significantly, indicated by
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trade aggregate amounted to USD 44 billion. In 2016,
China investments reached up to 400%, a significant
amount compared to the investment in the previous year.6
The conflict escalation in Natuna requires Indonesia to
strategically calculates its vis-a-vis position with China.
However, in many incidents in Natuna, Jokowi had indi-
cated the strong intention not to compromise about na-
tional sovereignty, especially regarding the issue of territo-
rial boundaries as a problem that should be resolved in a
diplomatic manner.
Constitutively, the growing importance of realism will
trigger the claimant states in the South China Sea to inter-
pret the conflict in the same realistic way. In this case of
fish theft in Natuna waters, China often behaves reactively.
If all agents respond the conflict in the region through
realism paradigm, the international structure in the sur-
rounding region will be formed under the realism para-
digm as well. This is because of the disbelief between agents
under the same interest. Related to the contestation in
the South China Sea, this article requires thorough and
careful analysis because countries in the region will also
conduct a comprehensive analysis of Indonesian policy in
Natuna water. Every single interaction in the waters will
determine the position of claimant states in the South
China Sea in the wider context; the conflict resolution for
the long-established conflict in the territory.
THE IMPLICATION OF INDONESIAN POLICY UNDER THE COM-
PLEXITY OF REGION MARITIME CONFLICT
Indonesian assertive behaviour toward illegal fishing
in Natuna waters evoked criticism from experts. “One
perennial complaint about Yudhoyono when he was in
power was his indecisiveness. President Jokowi wants to
be perceived as a decisive person, who does not always
dance to the tune of big power politics. He will soon find
out whether, in an interdependent world, a reclusive na-
tionalist is able to navigate through the rough seas all alone”
(Hamzah, 2015: 16). Indonesian effort to accomplish the
agenda of World Maritime Axis appear as a strong and
firm policy after the implementation of ‘Sink the Vessels’
policy for all fish theft activities in Indonesian waters.
Since December 2014, foreign vessels caught to collect
fish illegally were seized. Many of them were being sunk or
being dramatically exposed to be captured by the media.
Voting revealed that the act is one of the most popular
Jokowi’s policies. Indonesian decision to firmly execute
the policy was aimed to secure the maritime resources, as
stated by Susi Pudjiastuti as the Minister of Marine Af-
fairs and Fisheries, “I am not talking about the territorial
authority, but about maritime resources and fish. Fish in
our EEZ is our fish” (Tempo, 2016, para. 2). The policy,
indeed, ignited a strong reaction from the states who own
the vessels. The cases are mainly found in Natuna waters.
Pudjiastuti also stated that the biggest illegal fishing hap-
pened in Natuna.
Natuna Islands are located in Karimata Strait, the north-
ern part of Indonesia. The islands consist of small islands
which share borders with Malaysia, Singapore, and Viet-
nam (Tim Pusat Studi Pancasila UGM, 2015). The initial
observation of the research captured that Natuna experi-
enced the most frequent border violation, for instance,
IUU Fishing by foreign vessels. Several states recorded as
the most frequent offender are China, the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Thailand. This can be seen from the record
of sinking vessels during 2015, especially because of Natuna
has abundant marine resources.
The estimation of marine resources in Indonesia
reaches 6.6 million tons per year, consisting of 4.5 million
tons in Indonesian waters and 2.1 million tons in EEZ
waters. The number includes various types of fish, includ-
ing pelagic fish (3.5 billion tons), coral fish is 0.048 mil-
lion ton per year. Indonesian waters are also estimated as
a home for 3,000 types of fish (Statistic Data Center and
Information from Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisher-
ies, 2015). The various types of fish do not always refer to
the abundant amount of each type of fish. Several types of
fish such as sardinella lemuru fish, decapterus fish, and
skipjack tuna fish were identified as a type of fish with a
big population (Statistic Data Center and Information
from Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, 2015).
Administratively, Natuna shares its northern and east-
ern borders with the South China Sea; southern border
with Bintan District; western border with Malaysian pen-
insula. Fishing is the main activity recorded in Natuna. In
2015, fisheries production amounted to 48,698.84 tons
while fish from cultivation amounted to 754.84 ton. The
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growth of fish capture increased 2.87% in 2015 compared
to the previous year. At the same time, the number of fish
farming production declined to 69.55% (Statistic Data
Center and Information from Ministry of Marine Affairs
and Fisheries, 2015).
The number, however, was small compared to the data
of saltwater fish in Natuna. Data from Riau Province re-
vealed that in 2011, the fisheries production amounted to
504,212.85 ton per year with the amount of allowed cap-
ture (80% of the natural resources potential) was 403,370
ton (Bappeda Keppri, 2018). Marine capture fishery com-
modity in Natuna is classified into two categories, pelagic
fish and sardinella lemuru fish as it also contributes to the
highest of fish population in Indonesia (Statistic Data
Center and Information from Ministry of Marine Affairs
and Fisheries, 2016). Susi Pudjiastuti also stated that the
potential of fish capture in Natuna could reach 400,000
ton per year or equal to USD 400 million (Kompas, 2016).
The potential offered by Natuna has triggered attention
from surrounding states to exploit the marine resources
in Natuna waters, making Natuna as one of the biggest
targets of illegal fishing.
As explained by Febrica (2017), according to various
Indonesian government documents emphasise four piv-
otal maritime issues in Indonesian waters (cf. Dewan
Maritim Indonesia, 2007; Indonesian Coordinating Mi-
nistry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, 2008; Indo-
nesian MFA, 2004; Indonesian Ministry of State Secre-
tariat, 2008; Sudrajat, 2005; Suristyono, 2005), namely
illegal fishing, illegal migrants travelling through its wa-
ters, maritime border issues, and smuggling. Therefore,
Indonesia is exposed to three types of transnational crime.
The first threat is smuggling including illegal logging, fuel
and sand smuggling, and illegal fishing. The second iden-
tified threat is airplane hijacking, sabotage, and espionage
of Indonesian territory. The third possible threat is a dis-
ruption in Indonesian borders such as arms smuggling,
drug smuggling, and human trafficking. In the case of ille-
gal fishing, the maritime security approach used is
categorised into non-traditional security. In the contem-
porary geopolitical environment, maritime security has
emerged as one of the most significant elements of global
and human security (Reveron & Mahoney-Norris, 2011).
The Marine insecurity that emerges into a tangible
threat, in this context, could be analysed through two
models: traditional security and non-traditional security.
Traditional security threat which previously embroiled state
actors has eventually shifted as non-traditional issues which
have gained more attention. However, observance of tra-
ditional security threat could not be simply set aside. In-
donesia should be more considerate to the traditional se-
curity threat that could appear anytime. Furthermore, In-
donesia still has unfinished tasks related to water and land
border within the territory. The Indonesian Navy recorded
94 border violences by Malaysian warfare ships (Usman &
Din, 2009).
Based on the conceptual review, illegal fishing in Indo-
nesian waters appears as a non-traditional security threat
and leads to maritime-insecurity. However, in Natuna con-
testation, Indonesia shows assertive behaviour by stress-
ing the need to protect Natuna—with military force if nec-
essary—instead of responding it as a common maritime
sources theft by non-state actors. Indonesia considers that
its sovereignty has been violated and prone to crime and
hijack in the sea, as stated by one of Indonesian Navy offi-
cials.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia had issued a
caveat to protest about the issue (BBC Indonesia, 2016).
Moreover, President Widodo demonstrated a symbolic
warning by conducting a meeting in a warfare ship. This
action was interpreted by International Relations experts
and the media as a firm resistance toward Beijing
(Kusumadewi, 2016). The issue also received a strong reac-
tion from the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Law,
and Security Sector who served at the period, Luhut Binsar
Panjaitan.7 He stressed the importance to strengthen In-
donesian naval base in Natuna waters (Tweed, David, &
Brummitt, 2015). Moreover, the Ministry of Defence,
Ryamizard Ryacudu promised improvement of Indonesian
military power in Natuna for a specific reason: ‘to keep
the thieves away’ (The Straits Times, 2016). The response
was perceived as Indonesian assurance to improve its po-
litical realism to address the uncertainty of Natuna waters
security due to border violation by China. By taking a
deeper look on political contestation between states re-
garding illegal fishing in Natuna waters, it is apparent that
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friction between Indonesia and China had occurred fre-
quently due to intensive exposure from national and in-
ternational mass media. In fact, China is not the only state
who violate Indonesian territorial border. Neighbouring
states such as Malaysia and Vietnam also heavily involved
in the polemic.
Another aspect that needs to be considered is that 317
vessels had been sunk due to illegal fishing since October
2014 until April 2017. 142 Vessels originated from Viet-
nam, 76 vessels from the Philippines, 21 vessels from Thai-
land, 49 vessels from Malaysia, 21 vessels from Indonesia,
two vessels from Papua New Guinea, one vessel from
China, one vessel from Belize, and four vessels have no
origin state (Kuwado, 2017). Only one vessel was originated
from China and exploded in October 2014. This number
was much lower than Vietnam vessels that violated Indo-
nesian border and sunk. Another instance of fish theft in
Natuna happened in 2016 when Chinese vessel Kway Fey
11078 was clearly appeared entering Indonesian EEZ and
exploited fish in Indonesian waters. When the ship of
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries were patrolling,
the Chinese vessel chased and crashed the fish vessels, so
the ship could not be retrieved. This incident was strongly
protested by Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BBC
Indonesia, 2016). The conflict, however, was not only oc-
curred between Indonesia and China but also between
neighbouring countries in EEZ near Natuna waters. The
mass media keep broadcasting the amount of Vietnam
vessels seized by Indonesian patrol ship in Natuna waters
(al-Birra, 2017).
The circumstances in Natuna have logical consequences
toward Natuna security as the closest area to the South
China Sea. Therefore, there is an urgency to draw a clear
line about Indonesian sovereignty and to solve the delimi-
tation agreement of EEZ with neighbouring countries to
maintain Indonesian sovereignty and its maritime secu-
rity. In order to obtain sovereignty, a state should possess
unlimited supreme authority. Jean Bodin stated that so-
vereignty is “la puissance absolute et perpetuelle d’une
republique” (the absolute and perpetual power of a com-
monwealth). In other words, the absolute power occurs
continuously as a manifestation of a state sovereignty. In
the authors’ point of view, the failure to preserve author-
ity, supremacy, and unlimitedness of power will threaten
the state’s good image whether in international or national
perspective.
Observing the problem in Natuna waters will not be
sufficient without domestic framework analysis due to IUU
Fishing policy that had been implemented in Indonesian
sovereignty border. There is a need for a broader perspec-
tive to analyse Indonesian behaviour in the South China
Sea conflict. Thus, the initial point is to explain the po-
lemic and put it in the regional security structure context.
From the regional stability perspective, South East Asia
region has been known as an unstable region due to the
South China Sea conflict between China, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam. The con-
flict occurred as a consequence of overlapping claims of
the sovereignty of claimant states. Even though ASEAN
has attempted many efforts to decrease the probability of
conflict through the implementation of DoC, the conflict
still could not be resolved peacefully. In contrary, the con-
flict escalated, and China aggressively builds infrastructure
in the South China Sea.
China eagerness to expand its geopolitical realism in-
creased the hostility in the South China Sea and created a
security dilemma. The tendency was apparent from the
rise of state’s military spending in ASEAN and Asian states.
ASEAN member states showed the tendency to increase
its vigilance as a response to threats posed by China. For
instance, Vietnam has emerged as the most vocal oppo-
nent of China’s claims in the waterway, where more than
USD 3 trillion in cargo pass every year (Reuters, 2017).
Reality speaking, ASEAN countries within regional
organisation framework still struggle to firmly grasp a com-
mon ground towards South China Sea dispute (Reuters,
2016). Even though, the newest development shows that
ASEAN countries already adopted a negotiating framework
for a CoC in the South China Sea, but this move seen by
critics as tactic to buy China time to consolidate its mari-
time power (Reuters, 2017). Departing from those dynamic
political conditions, we could perceive that the realist para-
digm still become a major approach towards South China
Sea dispute and securing national interest became inevi-
table.
Finally, ‘Sink the Vessels’ policy towards geopolitics of
JURNAL HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
VOL. 7, NO. 2 / OKTOBER 2018 - MARET 2019128
the South China Sea creates a stronger relationship be-
tween Indonesia and the conflict of South China Sea. In-
donesian assertive manner in Natuna will strengthen real-
ism structure in the geopolitics of South China Sea con-
flict. The structure will eventually create agent behaviour
in the regional complexity to increase their vigilance. The
latest development fits into this broader pattern. In mid
of 2017, Indonesia proclaimed that it had renamed a re-
source-rich northern portion around its Natuna Islands,
which lie in the southern end of the South China Sea, as
the North Natuna Sea. The move, which was part of the
unveiling of an updated national map that was months in
the making, reflects the Southeast Asian state’s determi-
nation to safeguard its claims even amid the lingering chal-
lenges inherent in doing so (Parameswaran, 2017). With
this manoeuvre, Jakarta is beckoning that it is eager to
take new measures to even more clearly emphasise its firm
position that it does not recognise China’s unilateral nine-
dash line claim. Thereafter, Beijing responded this ma-
noeuvre by issued a demand for Indonesia to reverse its
decision to rename the South China Sea (SCS) waters that
lie within Indonesia’s EEZ (Jakarta Post, 2017).
According to Channel News Asia reports, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry sent an official note to the Indonesian
Embassy in Beijing dated August 25, expressing its oppo-
sition to the move. In the letter, China said Indonesia’s
move to change an “internationally accepted name” re-
sulted in the “complication and expansion of the dispute
and affects peace and stability.” Furthermore, Beijing stated
Indonesia’s unilateral proclamation could endanger the
stable relationship between Indonesia-China and halt the
progress of South China Sea dispute in a broader context.
Nonetheless, Indonesian high rank government official did
not falter. Shortly after renaming of the area, Maritime
Affairs and Fisheries Minister, Susi Pudjiastuti said Indo-
nesia had every right to make the decision. “The North
Natuna Sea falls within our territory, not within the South
China Sea […] We have the right [to rename the waters],
the North Natuna Sea is ours” (Sapiie, 2017, para.3). Buzan
(1998: 4) stated that “The internal structure of the South-
east Asian security complex is rather complicated.” South
East Asia consists of political units which categorized as
middle power (in Buzan words: medium-sized powers).
Since there is no hegemonic state in the region, the distri-
bution of power in South East Asia was projected to achieve
domestic security instead of formulating agreement at the
international level. Nevertheless, the rising of China has
undoubtedly improved its role in South East Asia. ASEAN
member states are in dilemmatic position whether to main-
tain good relations with China or to enforce regional soli-
darity under the stream of South China Sea conflict. In-
donesia, however, shows trajectory shift in performing its
role to develop a firmer region fragmentation. Therefore,
Indonesian IUU Fishing policy becomes essential. This
article concludes that the decision is precise, considering
the nature of Indonesian foreign policy under President
Joko Widodo who stressed the importance of domestic
interest instead of international orientation in implement-
ing their policy.
CONCLUSION
This article explained that claim of IUU Fishing Policy
has created a security dilemma and restored the anarchy
nature in Natuna waters, though which the nature of an-
archy itself can contain conflictual and rational perspec-
tives. Not every country showed reactive response like
China did when their vessels were sunk. For instances,
Vietnam and Malaysia chose to react based on the threat
of the South China Sea conflict which appears to be far
from the conflict resolution. The geopolitics of the South
China Sea after IUU Fishing was implemented could not
be separated from states interpretation of territory, natu-
ral resources, and distribution of power. Many conflicts
had occurred from the intersection of the three aspects,
thus it is important to put them into consideration in the
future.
As a conclusion, security in the South China Sea needs
to be taken into account by the Indonesian government
to enforce Indonesian defence in Natuna waters. It is im-
portant to include Natuna local officials to participate in
guarding the border area, so Natuna could be maintained
as one of security axes in Indonesian border. The recom-
mendation is based on our analysis of IUU Fishing Policy
in Natuna waters. The policy created a bolder realism struc-
ture of the international system in the South China Sea.
Finally, Indonesia needs to enhance the local capacity to
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support Indonesian foreign policy in the utmost synergic
and strategic way.
ENDNOTES
1 See Hayton (2014: 58) for a comprehensive historical explana-
tion about Chinese government claimed this semi-enclosed
water. Whereas, in May 1947 the Chinese parliament approved
a motion calling on the government to recover all the Paracels
from France, by force if necessary, and to clearly ‘delimit our
territory.’ Thereafter, the Chinese Geography Department of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs drafted a list of new names for all
the islands in the South China Sea.
2 See Beckman (2014: 58) for further explanation about the
Philippines’ statement of claim regarding South China, that is,
Scarborough Shoal and three islands that are within the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) claimed by the Philippines (these
being Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef).
3 In International Politics, there are three types of state status:
major, middle, and small power. The traditional preference in
determine the status was based on material aspect such as
geography, demography, natural resources, economy, military,
and many more. The aggregation of all factors created national
power in international stage. The related reference to support
the explanation is available on Holbraad (1984: 74), Middle
Powers in International Politics.
4 See related discussion about foreign politic inheritance in SBY
on Emirza Adi Syailendra, Indonesia’s Post-Election Foreign
Policy: New Directions? RSIS Commentaries No. 113/2014. It
was portrayed that the step taken was SBY personal endeavour
who wish to be recognised among the world leaders.
5 See Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks on
Indonesian Navy Vessels Harassing and Shooting Chinese
Fishing Boats and Fishermen, 19 June 2016.
6 The improvement of Indonesia and China bilateral relations in
economic field is a determinant factor which increases the
complexity in Natuna. The consideration to behave firmly on
border violation still need to regard China as the second
biggest economic power in the world who has substantial
contribution to achieve Indonesian goal to be the world
maritime axis.
7 Panjaitan currently serves as Coordinating Ministry of Maritime
Affairs.
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